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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RICK KEITH CATES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990402-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional guilty plea to one count of burglary of a 
dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does a "dwelling" under Utah's burglary statute include a rented camping 
trailer used as lodging by a family during a deer hunt? 
A trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correctness. See C.T. v. 
Johnson, 977 P.2d 479,480 (Utah 1999). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following dispositive statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 3, 1998, defendant was arrested for burglarizing a camping trailer in 
which Andrew and Jamie Sunkees, and their four-month-old daughter, were staying 
during the 1998 deer hunt [R. 1, 158]. Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, theft, possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, possession of 
a handgun by a restricted person, and a dangerous weapon penalty enhancement [R. 3-4, 
36]. At a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on all but the possession of a 
handgun by a restricted person charge [R. 31, 36]. 
On January 27, 1999, pursuant to a plea agreement, an amended information was 
filed charging defendant with one count each of aggravated robbery, burglary of a 
dwelling, and theft [R. 45-48]. Defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts [R. 47-48]. 
He specifically reserved his right to appeal the trial court's ruling that the camping trailer 
was a "dwelling" under Utah's burglary statute [R. 53,139-40]. Defendant filed a timely 
notice of appeal [R. 130]. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 3, 1998, defendant and his brother stormed into the camping trailer 
of Andrew and Jamie Sunkees, held guns to the Sunkees' faces, and stole Mr. Sunkee's 
wallet, his muzzleloader, and his knife. 
The crimes 
On November 1 or 2,1998, the Sunkees rented a 24-foot Mallard self-contained 
camping trailer from B & D Mobile Homes to use as lodging during the deer hunt. [R. 
157-58, 168]. On the same day, the Sunkees, with their four-month-old daughter, drove 
the camper up Blue Mountain Road and parked the camper in the same camping site 
which they had used during the previous year's hunt [R. 158, 168-69]. 
After a day of hunting on November 3rd, Andrew and Jamie returned to their 
camper at about 8:45 p.m. to relax and play cards [R. 156, 158]. Jamie paused to use the 
camper bathroom [R. 158]. No sooner had she entered the bathroom when defendant and 
his brother burst through the camper door, shoved a shotgun into Andrew's face, and 
yelled, "Don't move, mother " [R. 158, 160, 163-64]. Defendant, sporting a 
goatee and stocking cap, held the shotgun; his brother, wearing a stocking mask, held a 
cocked pistol [R. 158-60, 163-64, 188-89]. Defendant and his brother demanded that 
Andrew give them "everything" [R. 160]. Andrew quickly emptied his wallet of a two-
dollar bill and seventy-five cents [R. 160]. Defendant left the coins, but took the two-
dollar bill and Andrew's wallet, muzzleloader, and pocket knife [R. 160-61]. 
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When Jamie heard the unfamiliar voices, she came out of the bathroom [R. 162]. 
Defendant shoved the shotgun into her face and told her not to move [R. 162]. When she 
asked if she could get her baby, defendant said "no" [R. 162]. After he had grabbed 
everything he wanted, defendant said, "We will forget this, won't we?" [R. 162]. 
After defendant and his brother fled, Andrew immediately called the police on his 
cellular phone, described the truck the brothers were driving, and started out after them 
[R. 163, 171-72]. At about 9:00 p.m., Sergeant Robert Roth started toward the location 
and soon passed the truck that Andrew had described [R. 172-73]. He instructed an 
officer behind him to stop the vehicle [R. 172]. 
Corporal Vance Norton initiated the stop [R. 200]. Corporal Norton turned on his 
lights and siren and got directly behind the truck [R. 200-01]. The truck did not stop "for 
quite sometime," during which "both occupants were moving around inside the vehicle" 
[R. 201]. As the truck came to a stop, Corporal Norton was joined by Sergeant Steve 
Hatzidakis [R. 202]. Defendant was sitting in the passenger's seat; his brother had been 
driving [R. 178]. 
An initial visual inspection of the truck revealed a pistol, marijuana, and drug 
paraphernalia on the passenger's side floor board [R. 177, 180-81, 191, 204,207]. There 
were also some stocking caps and surgical gloves on the floor, as well as a gun holster 
and another pistol on the driver's side [R. 190,192-93]. A two-dollar bill was found in 
defendant's wallet [R. 198]. 
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Later, at the police station, Sergeant Hatzidakis asked defendant about the shotgun; 
defendant told him it was behind the truck seat [R. 184]. In fact, there were two pistols, a 
shotgun, a rifle, numerous shells, and Andrew's muzzleloader in the truck [R. 184-86]. 
The charges 
On November 5,1998, defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, theft, unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a handgun by a restricted person [R. 
3-4]. Defendant was also given notice of the State's decision to request a penalty 
enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon during commission of the felonies [R. 3]. 
At the preliminary hearing, defendant argued that the camping trailer into which 
defendant had unlawfully entered was not a "dwelling" under section 76-6-202 [R. 208-
210,215]. Specifically, defendant argued, "on the first degree charge, aggravated 
burglary, simply do not have a dwelling here that elevates the offense assuming that it 
occurred for purposes of discussion, to a first degree felony" [R. 215]. The State 
responded, "my argument on that issue is [inaudible] dwelling means a building. End of 
story" [R. 216]. 
In denying defendant's argument, the magistrate ruled: "It seems to me, 
particularly in our neck of the woods, if you have a trailer which you are using at your 
camp site for sleeping purposes, that is a dwelling. That's the way I interpret [the statute] 
quite clearly I think it's clearly a dwelling" [R. 215-16]. 
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On January 27, 1999, an amended information was filed in connection with a plea 
agreement that defendant would plead guilty to all three counts on the amended 
information [R. 45-48]. Count 2 of the amended information charged defendant with 
BURGLARY in violation of 76-6-202, a Second Degree 
Felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the 
defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any 
person. 
[R. 46]. Defendant pled guilty to the burglary charge but expressly reserved the right to 
appeal "whether or not the trailer that was entered is a 'dwelling9 within the meaning of 
the state burglary statute" [R. 139].1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The camping trailer in which the victims were staying is a structure "usually 
occupied by a person lodging therein at night." Thus, the magistrate properly ruled that 
the camping trailer is a "dwelling" under Utah's burglary statute. 
*Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(2) (1995) provides that burglary "is a felony of the 
third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
second degree." 
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ARGUMENT 
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY RULED THAT THE CAMPING TRAILER IN 
WHICH THE SUNKEES WERE LODGING DURING THE DEER HUNT IS A 
DWELLING UNDER UTAH'S BURGLARY STATUTE 
Defendant argues that the Sunkees' "rented trailer, briefly situated in the 
mountains for use during the deer hunt, is [not] a dwelling within the meaning of the 
burglary statute." Aplt. Br. at 6. In so arguing, defendant ignores the plain language of 
Utah's burglary statutes, case law addressing the issue, and the policy behind 
distinguishing between burglaries of dwellings and burglaries of other structures. 
"When faced with a question of statutory construction, [this Court] look[s] first to 
the plain language of the statute." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 
(Utah 1997) (citation omitted); see also State v. Harley, 982 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah App. 
1999). Statutory terms are interpreted and applied "'according to their commonly 
accepted meaning unless the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is 
either unreasonably confused, inoperable,... or in blatant contradiction of the express 
purpose of the statute.9'9 State ex. rel L.P., 981 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting 
State v. Soma, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993) (other citations omitted)) "[W]e 
assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read 
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Stephens, 935 
P.2d at 520 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Platts v. Parents 
Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997). Finally, "'[unambiguous language in 
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[a] statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.9" State v. Bagshaw, 836 
P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 
1989) (per curiam)). 
Section 76-6-202(1) provides that "[a] person is guilty of burglary if he enters or 
remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a 
felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) 
(1995). Section 76-6-202(2) provides that "[bjurglary is a felony of the third degree 
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree." 
Id. § 76-6-202(2). Section 76-6-201(1) defines "building" to include, "in addition to its 
ordinary meaning,... any . . . trailer,... or other structure or vehicle adapted for 
overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein." Id. § 76-6-
201(1). Section 76-6-201(2) defines "dwelling" as any "building which is usually 
occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually 
present." A/. §76-6-201(2). 
Defendant argues first that because section 76-6-201(1) defines "building" to 
include "'any . . . trailer... adapted for overnight accommodations of persons[,]'... 
[t]he plain meaning is that any trailer used for sleeping overnight is a building, not 
dwelling." Aplt. Br. at 10-11 (emphasis omitted and added). Inherent in defendant's 
argument is an assumption that a structure cannot be both a "building" and a "dwelling" 
under Utah's burglary statute. That assumption is erroneous. Under the plain language of 
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both definitions, "dwellings" are a sub-set of "buildings." Although not every "building" 
is a "dwelling" under the statute, every "dwelling" is necessarily a "building" under the 
statute. Thus, defendant's assertion that the victims' camping trailer cannot be a 
"dwelling" because it fits within the definition of "building" is incorrect. 
Because defendant concedes that the Sunkees' camping trailer is a "building" 
under the statute, see Aplt. Br. at 7 (asking whether camper is dwelling "or as Cates 
believes, a building"), the only question here is whether the camping trailer is also a 
"dwelling" or a "building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, 
whether or not a person is actually present." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(2). 
In State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah App. 1992), this Court was asked to 
determine whether a cabin, in which no one lived on a daily basis and which was 
occupied less than fifty percent of the time, was a "dwelling" under Utah's burglary 
statutes. After quoting the statutory definition of "dwelling," this Court held that "[t]he 
term 'usually occupied' refers to the purpose for which the structure is used. If the 
structure is one in which people typically stay overnight, it fits within the definition of 
dwelling under the burglary statute." Id. at 662. The Court found such an interpretation 
consistent with the legislature's intent "to protect people while in places where they are 
likely to be living and sleeping overnight, as opposed to protecting property in buildings 
such as stores, business offices, or garages." Id. The cabin was thus a "dwelling" under 
Utah's burglary statutes. See id. 
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Despite the plain language of Utah's burglary statute and this Court's holding in 
Cox, defendant contends that "the court of appeals should add to the only criterion used in 
Cox to determine whether a structure is a dwelling, that is, the purpose for which it is 
used, to include the physical attributes and characteristics of the structure." Apt. Br. at 
13. Specifically, defendant argues that a court should consider such attributes as 
"whether the trailer was readily mobile, whether it was subject to government regulation 
and control as a vehicle or house, whether it was in a place regularly used for residential 
purposes, whether it was connected to utilities, and whether it was in a place open to the 
public and available for public use." Aplt. Br. at 12. 
However, under the plain language of the statutes and under this Court's holding in 
Cox, none of these attributes are relevant. Rather, the test is only whether "the structure 
is one in which people typically stay overnight." Cox, 826 P.2d at 662; see also CT. v. 
Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah 1999) ("'[Cjourts are not to infer substantive terms 
into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the 
language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an 
intention not expressed.'") (citation omitted)); State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1229 
(Utah 1998) (same). 
Furthermore, defendant's proposed qualifications, such as mobility, would 
undermine the purpose behind punishing burglary of a dwelling more severely than 
burglary of any other building. Like the cabin in Cox, the nature of camping trailers and 
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R.V.'s is such that one may expect to find persons sleeping there at night, particularly 
when parked in the wilderness or camp site.2 The fact that a camping trailer is mobile has 
no bearing on whether people are likely to stay there overnight. Cf. Kanaras v. State, 460 
A.2d 61,68-71 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1983) (holding that 22-foot recreation vehicle parked at 
campsite is dwelling even though it is readily movable and must be registered with state 
motor vehicle administration), and cases cited therein; State v. Taylor, 428 S.E.2d 273, 
273-74 (N.C. App. 1993) (holding that 8-by-12 foot travel trailer in which farmer lived 
while temporarily employed was dwelling regardless of its "characteristic of mobility and 
lack of permanence99); Shoemaker v. State, 716 P.2d 391, 392 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that whether fishing boat was "dwelling" was question for jury).3 
The camping trailer in which the Sunkees were lodging clearly falls within the 
statutory definition of "dwelling" as interpreted by Cox. The camper was a 24-foot 
Mallard that the Sunkees had rented from B & D Mobile Homes (R. 168). Mr. Sunkee 
described it as a "self-contained," "regular camp trailer" (R. 157-58), implying that the 
Sunkees did not have to bring their own beds, bedding, dishes, etc. The camping trailer 
2The fact that the defendant and his brother went into the Sunkees' camping trailer 
well-armed certainly indicates that they expected to find people staying there. 
3The need to establish that the building is "usually occupied by a person lodging 
therein at night" alleviates any threat of the "slipperly slope" suggested by defendant. See 
Aplt. Br. at 8. "[A] large cardboard box, used as overnight accommodations," Aplt. Br. at 
8, for example, is not a dwelling because, even if it is a "building" under Utah's burglary 
statute, it is not one "usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night." 
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also had its own table and bathroom (R. 158, 168). 
In addition, the camping trailer was similar to one that the Sunkees had rented for 
lodging the year before (R. 169), meaning that the camping trailer is one commonly, 
regularly, and normally used for lodging. The Sunkees had already spent one night 
sleeping in the camper at that location and were preparing for their second at the time of 
the burglary (R. 169). 
As in the prior year, the Sunkees rented the camping trailer for the deer hunt (R. 
169), a time during which it is common for people to use campers for lodging in the 
wilderness. Moreover, the Sunkees parked the camper at the same campsite at which they 
had camped last year (R. 169), creating a certain predictability that the trailer would 
indeed be used for lodging. In short, the Sunkees' camping trailer was no different than 
the cabin which Cox determined to be a dwelling.4 
All this evidence, viewed as it must be in the light most favorable to the State, 
supports the conclusion that the camping trailer was one commonly and ordinarily used 
for lodging at night.5 Thus, the magistrate did not err in ruling that the Sunkees' camping 
4Because Utah's burglary statutes are clear on their face, reference to other, 
arguably unrelated statutory provisions, such as section 23-20-1(2) (1995), cited by 
defendant, is not necessary. In any case, the word, "trailer," did not appear anywhere in 
that provision. The provision was amended in 1998 and no longer addresses searches. 
See Utah Code Ann.§ 23-20-1(2) (1998). 
5The only evidence addressing the Sunkees' camping trailer is evidence elicited 
during defendant's preliminary hearing. Because the magistrate's ruling was made in the 
context of the preliminary hearing, all evidence concerning the attributes of the camping 
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trailer was a "building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night/ 
rather than one merely "adapted for overnight accommodation." 
Consequently, defendant's appeal fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State requests that this Court deny defendant's appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED Zk_ January 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
KARENA.KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
trailer must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See State v. Talbot, 
972 P.2d 435,437-38 (Utah 1998) (holding that magistrate should view evidence in light 
most favorable to prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of prosecution and 
"[u]nless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove 
some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim, the magistrate should bind the 
defendant over for trial" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
76-6-201. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any water-
craft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business 
therein and includes: 
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or 
vehicle; and 
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure 
or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when 
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining 
are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or 
privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Civil provisions, en-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201. try and detainer, § 78-36-1 et seq. 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted by L. Cross-References. —Agreement to commit 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-202. burglary, conspiracy, § 76-4-201. 
